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Andreas Marchetti/Louis-Marie Clouet 
Leadership by Credibility 
Franco-German Visions of the Future of the Union 
I. Europe at the beginning of a new decade 
The first decade of the 21
st century has just come to an end. Without having 
to wait for future findings and interpretations by political scientists, politi-
cal actors or even historians, one can surely say that this first decade was 
also a rather turbulent one. On a global scale, the most outstanding devel-
opments are linked to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, military 
interventions in Afghanistan and in Iraq and the international financial and 
economic crisis. In addition, one must also include – from a European per-
spective – the struggles to renew the treaties of the European Union, the 
obstacles and challenges to enlarging the Union, a continuing terrorist 
threat as evidenced in Madrid and in London, and the particular European 
implications of the financial and economic crisis, culminating in the crisis 
of the Euro. 
Despite this first-glance negative assessment, the first ten years of the 21
st 
century need not be considered a “lost decade” for Europe – if the Euro-
pean Union and its member states draw the right conclusions from these 
developments, face the challenges of the years to come as opposed to avert-
ing them and by pro-actively responding to these challenges. 
 
The authors thank Jared Sonnicksen for his comments on the manuscript. For documentary reasons, refer-
ences will particularly point to previously published results by members of the research team.  Andreas Marchetti/Louis-Marie Clouet 
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II. Four possible futures 
The Bavarian comedian Karl Valentin allegedly once declared that, in the 
past, even the future looked better. Although the turbulent times Europe is 
currently going through might serve as proof for such an assessment, it 
should not be forgotten, though, that European integration has already 
come a very long way: Over sixty years of integration are largely responsi-
ble for the abolishment of war between the countries involved, the solidifi-
cation of democratic institutions and procedures, a substantial and lasting 
increase in prosperity, for instance, achievements that nowadays are more 
or less taken for granted. Although the successes of the past can serve as 
inspiration, with respect to the turbulent years already passed and enormous 
challenges still ahead, Europeans cannot afford to lean back and be content 
with what they have accomplished as this is constantly being challenged. 
They rather need to find – likely new and innovative – ways to navigate 
through the current shallow and troubled waters. 
Responsible policy making must not only look at the short-term solution of 
acute challenges, but formulate and put in place sustainable policies, prac-
tices, and mechanisms in order to ensure the success of European integra-
tion in the future. In order to do so, a sober and objective assessment of 
today’s world is paramount; it is at the heart of possible future develop-
ments. Based on extensive analyses from a variety of experts (political sci-
entists, economists, engineers), three thematic clusters can be identified as 
presumably determining the course of European politics and Europe’s place 
on the international stage in the years to come: the social, the economic and 
the foreign policy field. With regard to the different levels of given adapta-
tion pressure and the EU’s and member states’ adaptation capacity in the 
three distinct fields,
1 four large-scale scenarios can be identified for the 
 
1   Pressure is high in the social field, whereas the Union’s capacity of adaptation is rather low in this 
area. In the economic sphere, pressure is also high; however, the Union’s instruments are rather well 
developed as well, resulting in an almost equally elevated capacity of adaptation. In foreign rela-
tions, pressure is medium with Union capacities still being equally medium. Leadership by Credibility 
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next ten years by inter-connecting potential developments within the three 
cluster areas and reducing them to the most plausible combinations.
2 
The most positive,
3 still plausible scenario (Scenario 1) depicts a renewed 
and pro-active Union, responding to social, economic and international ex-
pectations to a large degree. The presumably most likely trend (Scenario 2) 
rather hints towards ambivalent development perspectives for Europe. 
Whether it will lead to a better or worse development in the long-run, 
largely depends on policy-making processes and output. An alternative – 
rather negative – scenario (Scenario 3) paints the picture of a Europe per-
forming quite well in economic and foreign policy terms but failing to re-
spond to social expectations, deepening the gaps in European societies. The 
last, negative scenario (Scenario 4) depicts a Union well over its peak, fail-
ing to keep up the level of integration as set today because of a decreased 
likelihood and reduced willingness of member states to think and act 
“European”. 
Scenario 1: The “second founding”
4 of the European Union 
The European Union defines a new, broadly shared raison d’être as a result 
of Union and member states’ policies largely responding to current chal-
lenges and expectations. Increased international standing – on a solid per-
sonal and institutional basis – and an overall positive economic 
development increase acceptance of European policies considerably in the 
eyes of political actors and the public. 
 
2   For the individual analyses and a broader discussion of the assessments and assumptions leading to 
the four scenarios, see: Louis-Marie Clouet/Andreas Marchetti (eds.): L’Europe et le monde en 
2020: Essai de prospective franco-allemande, Villeneuve d’Ascq: Presses Universitaires du Septen-
trion 2011; Andreas Marchetti/Louis-Marie Clouet (eds.): Europa und die Welt 2020: Entwicklungen 
und Tendenzen (Schriften des Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung, 74), Baden-Baden: 
Nomos 2011. 
3   The terms “positive” and “negative” in this context refer to the relation of adaptation pressure and 
adaptation capacity: If the Union’s and its member states’ capacity is higher than the pressure ex-
erted, the Union can positively be considered as being pro-active; if pressure is higher than the adap-
tation capacity in a certain area, the assessment becomes negative, with a Union and member states 
being rather reactive. 
4   For the term, see Ludger Kühnhardt: European Union – The Second Founding: The Changing Ra-
tionale of European Integration (Schriften des Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung, 67), 
2
nd ed. , Baden-Baden: Nomos 2010. Andreas Marchetti/Louis-Marie Clouet 
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Conscious of the added value of acting together and the necessary pan-
European solidarity resulting thereof, the European Union supports the sus-
tainable transformation of Europe’s economy and also acts more coherently 
and in unison on the international stage. In the medium- to long-term, the 
Union is also believed to translate the positive economic and foreign policy 
development into the social sphere. This will be underscored by a cautious 
– positive – politicisation of European politics, less induced by citizens 
than by politicians: European Parliament elections will be conducted as real 
European elections with parties identifying front-runners for high EU of-
fices (e.g. President of the European Commission). Although this is 
unlikely to lead to a clearly defined and commonly shared identification 
with Europe, the local, regional and national sense of belonging will be ac-
companied by an increased consciousness of a – still vague – European 
identity. This development is facilitated by consistently respecting subsidi-
arity and the clear identification of the political responsibilities of different 
levels. Criticism of the EU will therefore be reduced to a realistic mini-
mum, focussing more constructively on concrete and contentious issues. 
Due to the increasing relevance of the EU and its growing acceptance, the 
Union will be, in turn, endowed with more efficient instruments. This will 
not necessarily lead to a new constitutional debate, but rather – if deemed 
necessary – to slight modifications of the existing treaties, with a clear 
preference to use the less complex mechanisms to amend their texts. In ad-
dition, rotation in the different formations of the Council will be given up 
on account of their inefficiency. The financial foundation of the Union will 
also be improved, either by adjusting the relative share of the Union budget 
with respect to member states’ contributions or by increasing the Union’s 
own resources. In important policy fields, new strategies, considered bind-
ing, will be formulated and existing ones updated, particularly focussing on 
a better coordination between Union and member states’ actions; this could 
possibly happen in various areas from foreign trade over energy and re-
source security up to security policy and defence. In areas particularly con-
cerning a limited number of member states, these will establish “avant-
garde groups” – without questioning the compatibility with the whole of Leadership by Credibility 
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Europe. Based on modes of flexibility in the “spirit of the treaties”, in the 
medium-term even enlargement policy can be revived. 
Scenario 2: Europe of (un)limited opportunities 
The European Union continues to progress on the basis of the Treaty of 
Lisbon. The Treaty will prove to be a solid basis for European politics, al-
though the Union will be unable to alter inefficiencies that arise. The 
“méthode Monnet” will remain the guiding principle of the Union’s func-
tioning, despite the importance attributed to “political Europe” in many ar-
eas. 
The extent to which the Union can really benefit from its relatively good 
position to realise its potentials will largely depend on its international per-
formance and economic development. Under the conditions of the Lisbon 
Treaty and the persistence of traditional modes of conducting European 
politics, given potentials can develop in a positive as well as in a negative 
manner. Economically, much will depend on Europe’s ability – with politi-
cal help – to really develop a “new”, i.e. solidly knowledge-based and sus-
tainable economy; internationally, much will depend on whether the Union 
can exercise international leadership according to its preferred model of 
constructing a multilateral world. If Europe responds positively to these 
challenges, the Union’s economic and foreign policy competences will 
consolidate even further, based on member states’ growing awareness that 
the Union is the right forum to tackle these issues. This will not lead to a 
substantial strengthening of the Union’s legal foundations; however, com-
pliance will increase along with “soft” modes of cooperation (coordination, 
best practices etc.). As this will happen without substantially challenging 
national sovereignties and member states’ competences, this can – in the 
medium-term – lead to new formal steps toward deeper integration. 
The scenario Europe of (un)limited opportunities hints well beyond the 
second decade of the 21
st century: As scenario of transition it can lead to a 
more pro-active Union (as described) and therefore – also institutionally – 
even lead to a second founding. However, if stagnation or restraint prevail 
in the areas of economy and international relations, Europe of (un)limited 
opportunities can also see itself driven back, endowed with fewer capaci-Andreas Marchetti/Louis-Marie Clouet 
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ties, leading to reduced policy output. The EU may prove to remain stable 
and solid for some time, but could not resist long-term internal and external 
challenges. Such a negative transition could pave the way for more sombre 
developments in the third decade of the 21
st century. If so, developments 
along the lines of both Europe divided as well as Volatile Europe appear to 
be possible. 
Scenario 3: Europe divided 
While the Union is advancing internationally and economically, the distri-
bution of wealth becomes increasingly unbalanced and therefore the pros-
perity gap in European societies widens. This leads to a stronger – conflict-
ridden – fragmentation within member states as well as between them. 
Intra-European solidarity decreases considerably, distributive struggles be-
tween member states become more and more pronounced. Increasing social 
tensions trigger a rise in nationalism; this development is accompanied by 
an analogous “Euro nationalism” (Timothy Garton Ash) to the outside of 
the Union, allowing a rather positive development in economics and for-
eign policy in the short- or even medium-term: The Union’s relatively 
strong position enables it to use its international clout to make the aggre-
gated interests of its member states heard on the international stage. How-
ever, with rising interior tensions and a need to satisfy political egoisms, 
the EU turns aside from the self-conception as cooperative international 
power; the claim to be a normative actor, playing a role of moral leader, 
cannot be maintained. In the long-run, such a Europe provokes – with its 
economically and internationally dominant behaviour – the rejection of 
“European” norms. Accordingly, it will also find itself more and more chal-
lenged beyond 2020. Hence, the scenario Europe divided is neither inter-
nally nor externally sustainable and therefore also a scenario of transition. 
In contrast to Europe of (un)limited opportunities, it rather heads toward a 
more negative development after 2020. Leadership by Credibility 
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Scenario 4: Volatile Europe 
Rather negative developments in the economic sphere and a decreasing in-
ternational standing go hand in hand with strongly negative developments 
in social terms, challenging the very existence of the European Union. 
Partly due to lacking competences, the Union does not live up to expecta-
tions, limiting the trust in its capacity to properly respond to current chal-
lenges. Although individual member states do also display deficiencies in 
their policy-output, they are strengthened by growing nationalism, accom-
panied by increased xenophobia throughout Europe. Even among political 
and societal elites, compliance and identification with the Union decrease. 
The project of European integration is challenged as such, although its 
structure remains in place to pursue purely national interests – in contrast to 
the “spirit of the treaties”: Such an EU will also see – formally within or 
outside the Union framework – the emergence of “avant-garde groups”, 
aiming to assert their aggregated national interests. Consequently, the EU 
loses its unifying, over-arching and co-operative fabric, dooming it to be-
come a forum to negotiate non-convergent interests and settle conflicts – at 
least peacefully – between governments. Growing controversies among EU 
member states lead to a re-intergovernmentalisation of the Union, based on 
the extensive use of given possibilities of formal obstruction or the threat to 
use them. This will lastingly prevent a further elaboration of the EU and its 
policies in a more integrative sense. Accordingly, the EU is reduced to the 
administration of given and uncontested policies or the formulation of poli-
cies that can even be pushed through against objections. This will result in 
a one-sided, negative politicisation of the Union: While a variety of issues 
are subject of severe disputes between member states, public sympathy and 
participation decreases significantly. European Parliament elections will 
definitely degrade to second-order-elections, the tendency to give more po-
litical power to this institution will be reversed. It likewise remains uncer-
tain whether and to which extent even the Court of Justice will be able to 
maintain its authority in interpreting the treaties. 
Internationally, the EU and its members see themselves increasingly mar-
ginalised. With ageing societies, decreasing productivity and growing in-
ternal problems, Europe sees itself politically and economically reduced to Andreas Marchetti/Louis-Marie Clouet 
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its actual geographic scope as Western peninsula of the Eurasian landmass, 
more and more dependant on other international players that manage to act 
more coherently and are therefore more resistant and performing. 
III. Leadership by Credibility 
Europe is at a crossroads, as highlighted by the Reflection Group on the 
future of Europe in spring 2010.
5 Although the scenario Europe of 
(un)limited opportunities is the most likely one, there are also good reasons 
to believe in a more negative development. With the particular challenge to 
the European “contrat social” – in the proper sense of the expression – the 
negative scenarios are less unlikely than one might hope for. In addition, 
even Europe of (un)limited opportunities does not automatically lead to a 
positive development of the Union: As scenario of transition, it will pave 
the way for the long-term development of the Union, well beyond 2020. 
The sort of the Union depends to a considerable degree on factors outside 
of the EU. These particularly concern the rise of new international players, 
the recalibration of international forums and their governance, threats to 
international security (including proliferation and terrorism), climate 
change and its repercussions on natural resources, international migration 
and the availability of energy resources as well as other commodities. Al-
though a priori exterior to the Union itself, what kind of impact these fac-
tors will have on the European Union and its member states largely 
depends on the way the Union and its members position themselves with 
respect to them. At a first glance, the Union’s current international position 
allows the EU to partly shape developments directly. Probably even more 
importantly, mentally and legally
6 the Union possesses also a rather solid – 
 
5   Project Europe 2030: Challenges and Opportunities: A report to the European Council by the Re-
flection Group on the Future of the EU 2030, Brussels 2010, p. 11-14, available at: 
http://www.reflectiongroup.eu/wp-content/uploads/2010/06/project-europe-2030-en.pdf. 
6   See Claire Demesmay/Andreas Marchetti (eds.): La France et l’Allemagne face aux crises euro-
pénnes, Pessac: Presses Universitaires de Bordeaux 2010; Claire Demesmay/Andreas Marchetti 
(eds.): Le Traité de Lisbonne en discussion: quells fondements pour l’Europe? (Note de l’Ifri, 60), 
Paris: Ifri 2009; Andreas Marchetti/Claire Demesmay (eds.): Der Vertrag von Lissabon: Analyse und 
Bewertung (Schriften des Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung, 71), Baden-Baden: No-
mos 2010. 
 Leadership by Credibility 
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albeit not always efficient – basis to adjust itself properly with respect to 
external but also to internal challenges. Among the latter, the way politics 
are conducted and policies are formulated concern the very structure of 
politics. With respect to policies, economic questions, budgetary and fiscal 
policies and the pressure exercised on the common currency feature high 
on today’s agenda, supplemented by concerns over the Union’s demo-
graphic development, education, science and research, strongly interlinked 
with the transformation of Europe’s economy. 
Any policy recommendation that intends to highlight potential options 
needs to particularly focus on the Union’s and member states’ capacities to 
positively respond to the challenges ahead. As both the input and output 
dimension of European politics are of relevance and – at least potentially – 
under review, different levels shall be considered: the ideational founda-
tions of the Union, the structural dimension of politics and policies, and 
concrete policy measures. 
“An ever closer union” 
For the European Union, the creation of “an ever closer union among the 
peoples of Europe” remains an ideational foundation as stated in the pre-
amble of the Treaty on European Union. However, with the debate about 
the Union’s finalité politique closed for the time being, this objective needs 
refinement in order to impact the current and future course of European 
integration, preventing its degradation to a mere declaratory phrase. “An 
ever closer union” can be understood as calling for more formal integra-
tion, an interpretation supported by the reform debate of the past decade, 
although the preamble links the expression directly to the principle of sub-
sidiarity. A pragmatic understanding should indeed focus less on the ques-
tion of finalité but on the way European political actors interact and 
produce policy outputs: If “an ever closer union” is not understood as a 
static aim but rather concerns the mode of politics and policy-making, it 
can serve as basic guiding line in responding to common challenges: Do 
political actors interact closely in the spirit of union? If actors and stake-
holders work closely together in formulating solutions to common chal-
lenges they will eventually augment the quality of policy output and Andreas Marchetti/Louis-Marie Clouet 
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thereby political and public acceptance. The respect for the formal rules of 
procedure is more or less uncontested, however, the rules of the game also 
need to be applied in the spirit of union. If necessary, naming and shaming 
can be applied to those resisting such a broad interpretation of the rules of 
the game. More publicity could also prevent the continuation of some ac-
tors’ habit of blaming “Brussels” – for decisions taken by the Council with 
member states’ governments’ involvement. 
If a true spirit of union prevails, even current reluctance to put in place new 
policies based on forms of flexible integration (i.e. enhanced co-operation) 
could be reduced, opening new and innovative ways of adapting the Union 
and its policies, even in cases in which not all of its member states feel 
equally concerned. As stated in the treaties, such flexible mechanisms must 
not conflict with the Union’s aims and coherence must be ensured with 
other policies. 
More coherence and efficiency 
The Union wants to “promote peace, security and progress in Europe and in 
the world” (preamble, Treaty on European Union): Hence, the Union and 
its actions have to be judged whether they live up to these ambitions and to 
expectations raised. A measure to evaluate the evolution of the Union in 
general and specific political steps in particular can be attained by looking 
at the development of the Union’s and member states’ adaptation capacity 
to efficiently respond to current challenges. In order to tackle the adapta-
tion pressure present in various fields today, the European Union has es-
sentially two options: 
1. It can generate synergies and formulate more efficient responses by act-
ing more closely together. 
2. It can attempt to decrease pressure itself. 
This does not necessarily imply more competences on the EU level but 
rather the formulation of policies in an increasingly Euro-conscious man-
ner. In practice, both approaches should be combined in order to attain fa-
vourable results and minimise negative side effects. Along the lines of a 
pragmatic interpretation of “an ever closer union”, the Union and its   Leadership by Credibility 
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member states will therefore – for the sake of effectiveness and even effi-
ciency – have to ensure the coherence of the entirety of policies. As the 
European Union is a system of multi-level governance, the demand for co-
herence concerns at least two aspects: 
1. On the level of political decisions and content, coherence between differ-
ent EU policies will need to be ensured. With diverse policies on the one 
hand and different Council formations and parliamentary committees re-
sponsible on the other hand, coordination will not be an easy task. It is thus 
paramount to ensure lasting positive effects of Union policies and to pre-
vent unintended – negative – consequences. This does not only concern 
coherence between evidently related policies but all – internal as well as 
external – policies. 
2. On the structural level of politics, coherence between European Union 
policies and member states’ policies will have to be realised as well. Cur-
rently, the juxtaposition of Union and member states’ policies often gener-
ates inconsistencies in overall European behaviour as most addressees of 
policies are not necessarily aware of their particular European, national or 
regional origin. Especially internationally, the distinction between Euro-
pean Union policies and national European states’ policies is rarely made, 
with both being perceived closely together. In order to prevent particular 
national policies to undermine European Union policies – or possibly vice 
versa – member states need to increasingly become aware of their respon-
sibility in European multi-level governance: They are no longer mere states 
but are defined as member states of the Union.
7 Only then, all policies – 
national as well as European – are likely to generate the aspired effects; 
otherwise, frictional losses are likely to occur. 
Some examples, deriving from the Franco-German study group on the fu-
ture of the EU and its environment,
8 can serve to highlight the implications 
of these conditions and the complexity of issues: 
 
7   Cf. Christian Calliess: “Schlusswort”, in: Christian Calliess/Karl-Heinz Paqué (eds.): Deutschland in 
der Europäischen Union im kommenden Jahrzehnt – Kreativität und Innovationskraft: Neue Impulse 
für Staat, Markt und Zivilgesellschaft, Düsseldorf: Hanns Martin Schleyer-Stiftung 2010, p. 278. 
8   See the reference in footnote 2. Andreas Marchetti/Louis-Marie Clouet 
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-  The Charter of Fundamental Rights, part of the primary law of the Un-
ion (Art. 6.1, Treaty on European Union) since the Lisbon Treaty, 
closely links personal, economic and social rights under one umbrella. 
With the impact of the economic, financial and budgetary crises and 
governments’ efforts to counter these, tensions have grown severely 
within as well as between member states of the EU. In the spirit of un-
ion, the EU and its member states will have to make clear, beyond 
mere declarations, that they will tackle the crises together in a socially 
tenable manner, preventing a further widening of social gaps in Euro-
pean societies. Sooner or later, the Union will have to allow for partial 
transfer mechanisms to prevent overly pointed distortions; in order to 
prevent free rides, their development has to be complemented – within 
the slowly developing gouvernement économique – by common proc-
esses to at least preview central national decisions with common im-
plications, including economic, fiscal and budgetary policies. Without 
transferring such competences to the Union, at least “soft” mecha-
nisms will have to be put in place to ensure pan-European compliance 
and a two-sided (and therefore acceptable) approach to solidarity: 
strong member states help weak ones; in line with the principle of 
subsidiarity, weaker ones work as much as possible to tackle their 
problems. 
-  In international politics, the European Union strives for a leading role. 
To do so, it will also have to satisfy demands to take on more interna-
tional responsibilities. As national budgetary constraints increase and 
EU member states increasingly lack the “critical mass” to make them-
selves heard as individual states on an international scale, such a role 
can only be attained by further developing the full range of Europe’s 
foreign, security and defence policy, making use of substantial syner-
gies by overcoming traditional national reservations. The elaboration 
of common structures (e.g. External Action Service) will increase in-
tra-European interdependencies but will also help the Union and its 
members to be more active and therefore broaden their capacity to in-
fluence world politics. Leadership by Credibility 
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-  On various occasions, the Union has highlighted its ambition to act as 
normative power on the international stage. If the European Union 
takes this ambition seriously, it needs to ensure that its own conduct – 
including member states’ – is in line with the normative and moral 
rules as promoted by the Union. If not, at least parts of the Union’s 
normative agenda suffer a continuous loss of credibility, hampering a 
positive impact; e.g. although the Union assumes the role of an inter-
national promoter of human rights, some border control practices (ei-
ther under national authority or even with participation of Union 
agencies) stand in stark contrast to these. If one looks at the underly-
ing issue of migration, one might even find European Union collabo-
ration with third countries not satisfying core standards of human 
rights and rights of refugees in particular.
9 These inconsistencies in-
creasingly call into question the credibility of the Union’s normative 
agenda, threatening its possibly positive effects. Only if the Union and 
member states comply with their own standards, they can expect oth-
ers to – maybe – subscribe to them as well. 
-  Ensuring the access to energy and other resources has been as high on 
the Union agenda of the past years as combating climate change and 
increasing environmentally sustainable practices. Particularly with re-
spect to fossil energy resources, the link between the two issues is 
evident. However, there are other dimensions interconnected: As the 
Union applies rather high environmental standards if it comes to the 
exploitation of European resources, it should – in the sense of a nor-
mative actor – also be more concerned with such standards in coun-
tries of origin to ensure the sustainability of exploitation. Currently, 
there is a strong imbalance between the internal and external exploita-
tion of resources, leading to the sub-optimal exploitation of European 
resources and also to a widening of the gap between high exploitation 
costs in Europe and considerably lower costs outside the Union. A 
more balanced policy could increase the attractiveness of European 
 
9   In addition, looking at internal aspects, European migration policy also needs to find a new balance 
between coping with the social implications of migration and satisfying the demographic and eco-
nomic needs of immigration. Andreas Marchetti/Louis-Marie Clouet 
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resources as well as ensure a more sustainable exploitation elsewhere 
by at the same time reducing EU dependency in at least some sectors. 
-  Generally, the social and environmental policies and efforts of the EU 
cannot only be limited to the Union itself. With potential long-term ef-
fects on international stability and migration, the Union should in-
creasingly consider social and environmental aspects in its trade 
policies and ensure that a minimum of working rights and working 
environment standards is being satisfied by products entering the 
European market, just as they should satisfy a minimum of environ-
mental conditions. This could be promoted by e.g. Union behaviour in 
WTO or its commitment to have trading partners join and comply 
with ILO standards etc. Two results can be expected of this, as the 
Union – one of the most important trading partners for most econo-
mies – has the economic weight to promote appropriate change in this 
area: Externally, the Union would help to improve working conditions 
and to reduce negative environmental impacts; internally, the Union 
would be able to reduce the gap between average European production 
costs (related to its own social and environmental standards) in rela-
tion to other competitors. 
-  Whereas the reform of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) mainly 
focuses on distributive aspects within the EU, it has major implica-
tions on many economies outside of the Union, particularly in devel-
oping countries. As subsidised European agricultural goods reduce the 
comparative advantages of these economies if it comes to agriculture, 
CAP puts into question certain objectives as defined in the Union’s 
development cooperation. Accordingly, these two need to be consid-
ered more closely together. With respect to their interconnectedness 
the Union might, taking into account some member states’ reluctance 
as well as compliance with WTO rules, opt for a reform of CAP that 
does not abolish it altogether but at least prevents subsidised agricul-
tural goods from distorting the world market. This would preserve the 
core of CAP and also benefit developing countries. In addition, the 
still restrictive market access for agricultural products into the Union Leadership by Credibility 
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would need to be reviewed – but the Union should also consider the 
aforementioned social and environmental standards. 
In many areas, the Union has acquired substantial competences over the 
past decades. With 500 million inhabitants, political stability based on the 
principle of liberal democracy, one of the largest economies with a strong 
and competitive industry, the second most important international currency 
(despite current problems), the Union undoubtedly disposes of considerable 
political and economic resources and relevance, preconditions to take on a 
leading role. But with rising scepticism about the Union’s capacity to posi-
tively forge the future,
10 it can only continue to play a prominent role – in 
Europe and beyond – if it consistently sticks to its commonly agreed mo-
tives and aims within policies and avoids inconsistencies between policies – 
much more than up to now. Its formal rules of decision making (input le-
gitimacy) play just as important a role as its performance (output legiti-
macy). As performance and impact are not only based on objective 
resources but on political will and the internal as well as external percep-
tions of Union behaviour, only a leadership by credibility, based on coher-
ence in the input- and output-dimension, can considerably advance the 
Union. Internally, inconsistencies need to be abolished, demanding of the 
Union and its members to act coherently over the entire range of political 
actions in order to (re)energize a true and concrete spirit of union, improv-
ing the lives of people living in the European Union; externally, the same 
approach will strengthen the Union’s position and impact, as the current – 
alas justified – argument of double standards could no longer be applied to 
the Union itself. 
IV. The Way Forward: Taking the Lead 
Realising a Union leadership by credibility is already an ambitious aim, 
even more so in a Union constituted of 27 distinct member states. How-
ever, this shall not prevent the Union to advance in this direction as the po-
litical potential of the concept is appealing: A Union following clearly 
 
10   See Eurobaromètre 73: L’opinion publique dans l’Union européenne, Vol. 1, Brussels: European 
Commission 2010, p. 246-249. Andreas Marchetti/Louis-Marie Clouet 
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defined lines in the wide array of its policies, acting in solidarity and bring-
ing into play not only its physic resources but also its political integrity, 
will internally and externally be considered a rational and reliable player. 
As powerful and credible actor it will be able to advance its goals and truly 
work as a force for good in Europe and even beyond. The alternative, a Un-
ion following different logics and displaying continuous internal divisions 
and political contradictions, would sooner or later weaken political Europe 
and possibly lead to the scenario Europe divided or even Volatile Europe. 
Just as a prominent European role largely depends on resources, relevance 
and the political will to act in line with the concept of leadership by credi-
bility, leading the Union towards this aim depends on the same set of con-
ditions – conditions realistically only large member states can permanently 
fulfil. In addition, these member states need to be willing to adapt their own 
preferences in order to forge compromises. For their formulation, it might – 
paradoxically at first – be helpful if two or more players’ original positions 
in concrete policy issues are not similar or even identical. Although this is 
likely to complicate the launch of concrete policy proposals, a compromise 
between two or three major players possibly already covers a vast spectrum 
of preferences throughout the Union, therefore facilitating the eventual 
elaboration and decision making at 27. 
Looking at European member states and their preferences in central policy 
fields today, once again France and Germany appear almost naturally as 
potential leaders in many fields: Firstly, they dispose of considerable re-
sources and political relevance. Secondly, they often do not share the same 
positions, e.g. in energy policy, fiscal and economic policy, security and 
defence etc.,
11 but regularly already represent the preferences of other 
member states as well. Thirdly, they are commonly willing to work to-
 
11   Cf. Claire Demesmay/Andreas Marchetti: Frankreich ist Frankreich ist Europa: Französische Eu-
ropa-Politik zwischen Pragmatismus und Tradition (DGAPanalyse Frankreich), Berlin: Deutsche 
Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik 2010; Andreas Marchetti: “Herausforderungen für das deutsch-
französische ‘Tandem’”, in: ZEI (ed.): Partner Frankreich: Positionsbestimmungen zwischen Krise 
und Aufbruch [Documentation of the 13
th Europakolloquium], Bonn: ZEI 2009, p. 7-15; Andreas 
Marchetti: “Deutschland zwischen Ost und West: Die Beziehungen zu Polen und Frankreich fünf 
Jahre nach der Osterweiterung”, in: Wolfram Hilz/Catherine Robert (eds.): Frankreich – Deutsch-
land – Polen: Partnerschaft im Herzen Europas (Discussion Paper, C 199), Bonn: ZEI 2010, p. 57-
66. Leadership by Credibility 
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gether in view of putting forward propositions on the European level. By 
doing so, they have to prove constantly that their European policies do not 
only serve their own specific interests but promote the advancement of the 
Union as a whole. As long as a leading role of France and Germany is not 
perceived as a “directoire”, trying to dictate or impose French and German 
positions on the other members of the Union, their role is acceptable to 
others and their ability to prepare and positively influence European poli-
tics is considerable. In this sense, Franco-German collaboration implies a 
high European responsibility and therefore cannot be considered exclusive. 
Other constellations of member states might just as well help the Union to 
advance common positions and policies. Not without reason there have 
been repeated attempts to open up Franco-German bilateralism to Poland in 
the framework of the “Weimar triangle”. However, such a trilateral constel-
lation features an almost geometric problem: On many occasions, one part-
ner might find its position in opposition to the other two, making him 
reluctant to discuss this particular issue in a trilateral forum. Bilaterally, 
other couples also display potential for leading roles, e.g. France and the 
United Kingdom in defence. Nonetheless, both the trilateral “Weimar tri-
angle” and other bilateral formations lack the institutional depths of 
Franco-German relations ever since the signing of the Élysée Treaty in 
1963. Based on a longstanding socialisation of actors and a constantly up-
dated and refined institutional basis, France and Germany are best posi-
tioned to assume the role of lead nations in supporting the European Union 
to assume leadership by credibility.  
 Das Zentrum für Europäische Integrationsforschung (ZEI) ist ein interdisziplinäres For-
schungs- und Weiterbildungsinstitut der Universität Bonn. ZEI – DISCUSSION PAPER richten sich 
mit ihren von Wissenschaftlern und politischen Akteuren verfassten Beiträgen an Wissenschaft, 
Politik und Publizistik. Sie geben die persönliche Meinung der Autoren wieder. Die Beiträge fas-
sen häufig Ergebnisse aus laufenden Forschungsprojekten des ZEI zusammen.  
 
The Center for European Integration Studies (ZEI) is an interdisciplinary research and further 
education institute at the University of Bonn. ZEI – DISCUSSION PAPER are intended to stimulate 
discussion among researchers, practitioners and policy makers on current and emerging issues 
of European integration and Europe´s global role. They express the personal opinion of the au-
thors. The papers often reflect on-going research projects at ZEI.  
 
Die neuesten ZEI Discussion Paper / Most recent ZEI Discussion Paper: 
 
C 191 (2009)  Meredith Tunick 
Promoting Innovation in the European Union. On the Development of Sound Com-
petition and Industrial Policies 
C 192 (2009)  Frank Decker/Jared Sonnicksen 
The Election of the Commission President. A Presidential Approach to Democratis-
ing the European Union 
C 193 (2009)  Aschot L. Manutscharjan 
Der Berg-Karabach-Konflikt nach der Unabhängigkeit des Kosovo 
C 194 (2009)  Wiebke Drescher 
The Eastern Partnership and Ukraine. New Label – Old Products? 
C 195 (2009)  Ludger Kühnhardt/Tilman Mayer (Hrsg.) 
Die Gestaltung der Globalität. Neue Anfragen an die Geisteswissenschaften 
C 196 (2009)  Ina Hommers 
Die Migrationspolitik der EU. Herausforderung zwischen nationaler Selbstbestim-
mung und europäischer Konvergenz 
C 197 (2010)  Klaus Hänsch  
Europäische Integration aus historischer Erfahrung. Ein Zeitzeugengespräch mit  
Michael Gehler 
C 198 (2010)  Ludger Kühnhardt/Tilman Mayer (Hrsg.) 
Die Gestaltung der Globalität. Annäherungen an Begriff, Deutung und Methodik 
C 199 (2010)  Wolfram Hilz/Catherine Robert (Hrsg.) 
Frankreich – Deutschland – Polen. Partnerschaft im Herzen Europas 
C 200 (2010) 
 
 
C 201 (2010) 
Klaus W. Grewlich 
Pipelines, Drogen, Kampf ums Wasser – greift die EU-Zentralasien-Strategie? 
Neues „Great Game“ von Afghanistan bis zum Kaspischen Meer? 
Uwe Leonardy 
Is the European Federation a „Mission Impossible“? A Critical Analysis of the Ger-
man Constitutional Court’s Judgment on the Lisbon Treaty 
C 202 (2010)  Günther H. Oettinger 
Europeanising EU Energy Policy 
C 203 (2011)  Ludger Kühnhardt/Tilman Mayer (Hrsg.) 
Die Gestaltung der Globalität. Wirkungen der Globalität auf ausgewählte Fächer 
der Philosophischen Fakultät 
C 204 (2011)  Derviş Fikret Ünal 
EU-Russian Relations: Evolution and Theoretical Assessment 
C 205 (2011)  Andreas Marchetti/Louis-Marie Clouet 
Leadership by Credibility. Franco-German Visions of the Future of the Union 
 
Die vollständige Liste seit 1998 und alle Discussion Paper zum Download finden Sie auf unserer 
Homepage: http://www.zei.de. 
For a complete list since 1998 and all Discussion Paper for download, see the center‘s home-
page: http://www.zei.de. 